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Abstract
Conspiracy theories can be treated as both rational narratives of the world as well as 
outcomes of underlying maladaptive traits. Here, we examined associations between belief in 
conspiracy theories and individual differences in personality disorders. An Internet-based 
sample (N = 259) completed measures of belief in conspiracy theories and the 25 facets of the 
Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5). Preliminary analyses showed no significant 
differences in belief in conspiracy theories across participant sex, ethnicity, and education. 
Regression analyses showed that the PID-5 facets of Unusual Beliefs and Experiences and, to 
a lesser extent, Suspiciousness, significantly predicted belief in conspiracy theories. These 
findings highlight a role for maladaptive personality traits in understanding belief in 
conspiracy theories, but require further investigation. 




Conspiracist beliefs usually refer to a set of false narratives in which multiple agents 
are believed to be working together toward malevolent ends (Swami & Furnham, 2014). For 
example, some people believe that, rather than crashing at sea, Amelia Earhart and Fred 
Noonan intentionally downed their aircraft near Japanese occupied territory so that the U.S. 
Navy could spy on the Japanese during the subsequent rescue mission (Swami & Furnham, 
2012). Such beliefs are widespread: data from four nationally representative surveys have 
shown that half of the American public endorse at least one conspiracy theory (Oliver & 
Wood, 2014). In addition to being widespread, belief in conspiracy theories also has negative 
health, socio-political, and environmental consequences (for a review, see Douglas, Sutton, 
Jolley, & Wood, 2015). For example, recent studies have suggested that belief in conspiracy 
theories is associated with decreased trust in government services and institutions (Glick & 
Einstein, 2015) and decreased pro-social behaviour and science acceptance (van der Linden, 
2015).
Recent work has attempted to conceptualise conspiracy theories as both neutral, 
rational narratives of the world and the outcome of psychopathology (e.g., Nefes, 2015). In 
terms of the former, it is postulated that conspiracy theories offer simplistic explanations for 
individuals attempting to make sense of events that are confusing, difficult to comprehend, or 
poorly explained by mainstream sources of information (Swami & Furnham, 2014). The 
latter view, on the other hand, suggests that there are maladaptive cognitive-perceptual traits 
that contribute to the formation or maintenance of anomalous beliefs, including conspiracy 
theories. While acknowledging that the lens of psychopathology offers only a partial account 
of the popularity of conspiracy theories, this perspective nevertheless suggests that 
maladaptive cognitive or perceptual traits may make assimilation or maintenance of 
conspiracist beliefs more likely (van Elk, 2015). 
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In support of this perspective, studies have reported positive associations between 
belief in conspiracy theories and traits including paranoia, magical ideation, and belief in the 
paranormal (e.g., Brotherton & Eser, 2014; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Stieger, 
Gumhalter, Tran, Voracek, & Swami, 2013; Swami et al., 2011). In explanation, it has been 
suggested that conspiracy theories and anomalous beliefs share features in common (e.g., 
both overly rely on intuitive-experiential processing of information and lack rigorous, self-
generated testing; Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran & Furnham, 2014) and that endorsement of 
one set of anomalous beliefs (e.g., belief in the paranormal) makes acceptance of other 
anomalous beliefs (e.g., conspiracy theories) more likely (Ramsay, 2006). From this 
perspective, intra-individual endorsement of inadequate explanations for events is a key 
factor shaping the assimilation and maintenance of maladaptive beliefs (Drinkwater, Dagnall, 
& Parker, 2012), but this in itself is not necessarily evidence of underlying maladaptive trait 
influence.
To address this issue, a number of studies have focused more specifically on 
associations between belief in conspiracy theories and schizotypy, a set of cognitive, 
perceptual, and affective traits ranging from normal dissociative states to extreme states. 
These studies have reported significant and positive associations between belief in conspiracy 
theories and schizotypy (e.g., Darwin, Neaves, & Holmes, 2011; Swami et al., 2013), and in 
explanation it has been suggested that traits of suspiciousness seen in high schizotypal 
individuals may result in them disbelieving official or mainstream sources of information. 
Additionally, characteristics associated with paranoid ideation may result in distorted 
perceptions and a misappreciation of intention that result in conspiracist ideation (Darwin et 
al., 2011; van der Tempel & Alcock, 2015). 
Despite these findings, there are a number of issues requiring clarification. First, 
where facets of schizotypy have been examined, it appears that traits associated with odd 
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beliefs and magical thinking – the traits most closely associated with belief in the paranormal 
– are predictive of belief in conspiracy theories, whereas other schizotypal facets show 
weaker or non-significant associations (Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 
2014). Second, it has been reported that it is delusional traits, rather than schizotypy per se, 
that may lead to greater acceptance of conspiracy theories (Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, 
Denovan, & Parton, 2015). That is, the association between schizotypy and conspiracist 
ideation reported in earlier studies may reflect an indirect measurement of delusional ideation 
in measures of schizotypy. Collectively, these studies suggest that it is a tendency toward 
paranoia or delusional ideation that shapes belief in conspiracy theories (Dagnall et al., 2015), 
although more in-depth research is necessary to fully understand these associations. 
Here, we sought to clarify aspects of this literature by focusing, not on schizotypy, but 
rather on maladaptive personality traits. To address concerns with the discrete categorical 
model of personality pathology used since the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; see Widiger & Trull, 2007), a dimensional trait model of 
individual differences in personality disorders is included in Section III of the DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). This model proposes 25 trait facets that are 
classified into five broad trait domains, four that are suggested to be common to both normal 
and abnormal personality variation (Antagonism, Negative Affectivity, Detachment, and 
Disinhibition) and a Psychotism domain that subsumes traits of schizotypy and dissociation 
(Krueger, Derringer, Markon, Watson, & Skodol, 2012). This trait assessment provides a 
multi-level description of personality disorders for DSM-5 and provides a key step in building 
models of personality pathology. 
From the point-of-view of studies on conspiracist ideation, this model offers an 
opportunity to refine existing knowledge of the relationships between belief in conspiracy 
theories and maladaptive traits. This can be achieved through the model’s broader focus on 
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maladaptive personality traits and also by providing orienting dimensions for understanding 
maladaptive beliefs more generally. That is, by using broad dimensions that span normative 
and pathological functioning, it becomes possible to develop a reliable scaffold to understand 
the nature of conspiracist ideation. In addition, given evidence that the DSM-5 dimensional 
trait model are maladaptive variants of general personality structure (e.g., Gore & Widiger, 
2013), a focus on the former may help to explicate mixed and typically weak associations 
between conspiracist ideation and the Big Five personality domains (Swami, Chamorro-
Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Swami et al., 2011; Swami & Furnham, 2012). 
In summary, the present study examined relationships between maladaptive 
personality facets and belief in conspiracy theories. Of the 25 facets proposed in the DSM-5 
dimensional trait model (see Table 1), those associated with the Psychotism domain would 
seem most likely to be associated with belief in conspiracy theories. These facets tap those 
constructs that have been identified as predictors of conspiracist ideation in previous studies 
(Barron et al., 2014; Dagnall et al., 2015), but offer broader coverage of maladaptive 
personality traits. In addition, the facet of Suspiciousness (subsumed within the domain of 
Negative Affectivity) would appear to be another potential candidate, given commentary 
about distrust of others in conspiracist ideation (Drinkwater et al., 2011). Although other 
facets of the DSM-5 dimensional trait model are less likely to show predictive relationships 
with belief in conspiracy theories, we nevertheless included them in our analyses. 
2. Method
2.1 Participants and Procedures
A brief description of the study, including estimated duration and compensation, was 
posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website in July 2015. MTurk is a 
crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that allows individuals to complete online tasks for 
monetary compensation. The present study was advertised to MTurk workers who achieved 
CONSPIRACY THEORIES 7
at least a 98% approval rate and completed at least 1,000 hits. The study was described to 
potential participants as an investigation of personality and attitudes toward world events. 
After providing informed consent, participants were directed to the measures described below 
(as well as a measure of modern health worries not analysed here; Petrie et al., 2001), which 
were presented in an anonymous form and in random order via the randomisation function 
with Qualtrics, which hosted the survey. In exchange for completing the survey, participants 
were paid $1.00. Participants with large amounts of missing data (n = 17) were excluded 
from the dataset. All participants received debriefing information at the end of the survey.
The final sample consisted of 130 women and 129 men, who ranged in age from 19 to 
74 years (M = 36.36, SD = 11.12). Due to an administrative oversight, we did not collect 
information about participants’ country of origin. However, the majority of participants 
identified as White (54.1%), with 25.1% identifying as Asian, 18.9% as multiracial, and 1.9% 
as some other ethnic group. In terms of educational qualifications, 8.1% had completed 
secondary schooling, 23.9% had a post-secondary qualification, 42.5% had an undergraduate 
degree, and 25.5% had a postgraduate degree. 
2.2 Measures
Maladaptive personality traits. The Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (PID-5; 
Krueger et al., 2012) is a 220-item self-report inventory that assesses the maladaptive 
personality traits proposed in Section III of DSM-5. The measure taps 25 maladaptive 
personality traits, organised based on factor analytic evidence into five broad domains. Each 
trait is measured by 4 to 14 items, with responses made on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 
(Very false or often false) to 3 (Very true or often true). Facet scores were computed as the 
mean of items associated with each facet. PID-5 scores have been shown to have good 
internal consistency and factorial validity (Wright et al., 2012), as well as good concurrent 
validity (Hopwood, Thomas, Markon, Wright, & Krueger, 2012). Cronbach’s α in the current 
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sample for the PID-5 domain scale scores were good, while facet scores were acceptable-to-
good (see Table 1).  
Belief in conspiracy theories. Participants completed the Belief in Conspiracy 
Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami et al., 2010, 2011), a 15-item measure that describes a 
range of internationally-popular conspiracy theories. Participants rated their belief that each 
conspiracy was true on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (Completely false) to 9 (Completely 
true). An overall score was computed as the mean of all items, with higher scores reflecting 
greater belief in conspiracy theories. Scores on this measure have been shown to be one-
dimensional (Swami et al., 2011) and correlate strongly with scores from a generic measure 
of conspiracist ideation (r = .88; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). In the present study, 
Cronbach’s α for the BCTI was .93.
Demographic form. Participants provided their demographic details, consisting of 
sex, age, ethnicity, and highest educational qualification. 
3. Results
3.1 Preliminary Analyses
An independent-samples t-test showed no significant differences in belief in 
conspiracy theories between women (M = 4.15, SD = 1.91) and men (M = 4.23, SD = 1.73), 
t(257) = 0.34, p = .732, d = 0.04. Analyses of variance also showed that, in this sample, there 
were no significant differences in belief in conspiracy theories between ethnic groups, F(3, 
255) = 2.28, p = .080, ηp2 = .02, and between educational groups, F(3, 255) = 0.87, p = .456, 
ηp2 = .01. Younger participants were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, r = -.20, p 
= .001, but the effect size was small. For these reasons, we treated the sample as a whole for 
all further analyses. 
3.2 Regression Analyses
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Belief in conspiracy theories was significantly and positively associated with all five 
PID-5 domains (rs = |.34|-|.49|) and all PID-5 facets (rs = |.24|-|.48|; see Table 1). Entering the 
25 PID-5 facets into a multiple linear regression using belief in conspiracy theories as the 
criterion variable resulted in a significant regression, but multicollinearity was a limiting 
issue in this analysis (variance inflation factors [VIFs] = 2.11-12.38) and remained 
problematic when domain scores were used as predictor variables instead (VIFs = 2.36-6.87). 
Although multicollinearity is not a direct statistical assumption of multiple regression 
analyses (Osborne & Waters, 2002), it can complicate interpretation of results because of its 
influence on the magnitude of regression weights and inflation of their standard error, which 
in turn affects the statistical significance tests of these coefficients (Nimon, Henson, & Gates, 
2010). In short, the presence of multicollinear data makes interpretation of standardised and 
unstandardised regression coefficients problematic. 
To minimise the problems associated with multicollinearity, we followed good-
practice procedures to reduce the number of variables included in the analysis (Dohoo, 
Ducrot, Fourichon, Donald, & Hurnik, 1997). The most straightforward way to accomplish 
this was to screen all PID-5 facets using unconditional statistics and to then select a subset of 
variables for inclusion in the final analysis. Based on this method, we selected the five PID-5 
facets that were most strongly correlated with belief in conspiracy theories (bold coefficients 
in Table 1): Unusual Beliefs and Experiences, Perceptual Dysregulation, Eccentricity, 
Suspiciousness, and Callousness. Inter-facet correlations between these five factors were all < 
|.66| and, as such, were within acceptable parametres for inclusion (Dohoo et al., 1997). 
These facets were then entered into a multiple linear regression with belief in conspiracy 
theories as the criterion. This regression was significant, F(5, 253) = 18.50, p < .001, Adj. R2 
= .25, and inspection of the VIFs suggested that multicollinearity was less of a constraining 
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issue (VIFs = 2.02-3.35). Of the PID-5 facets entered into the model, the only significant 
predictors were Suspiciousness and Unusual Beliefs and Experiences (see Table 2). 
To check that this result was not spurious, we also conducted a stepwise regression 
with all 25 facets as predictors and belief in conspiracy theories as the criterion variable. 
Although stepwise regressions typically yield biased R2 values and confidence intervals for 
effects and predicted values that are falsely low (Derksen & Keselman, 1992), it can be used 
to confirm the results of linear regressions, especially when dealing with multicollinearity 
(Kuhn & Johnson, 2013). The final prediction model contained 2 of the 25 predictors 
(Unusual Beliefs and Experiences and Suspiciousness) and was reached in two steps, with the 
remaining 23 facets excluded. This model was statistically significant, F(2, 256) = 45.27, p < 
.001, Adj. R2 = .26. Belief in conspiracy theories was primarily predicted by Unusual Beliefs 
and Experiences (B = .45, SE = .09, ß = .34, t = 4.73, p < .001, Adj. R2 = .23), and to a lesser 
extent by Suspiciousness (B = .36, SE = .12, ß = .22, t = 3.12, p = .002, Adj. ΔR2 = .03). VIFs 
for the analysis were within acceptable parameters (1.76). 
4. Discussion
In this study, we sought to move the study of conspiracy theories forward by 
examining associations between belief in conspiracy theories and maladaptive personality 
traits. Our results showed that belief in conspiracy theories was most strongly associated with 
the Unusual Beliefs and Experiences facet of the PID-5. In broad outline, this finding is 
consistent with previous work showing that facets of schizotypy closely associated with odd 
beliefs and magical thinking are most strongly predictive of belief in conspiracy theories 
(Barron et al., 2014). While it is clear that there is some shared space occupied by facets of 
the PID-5 and measures of schizotypy (Ashton, Lee, de Vries, Hendrickse, & Born, 2012), 
we believe our findings point to a broader picture of maladaptive personality traits that 
influence anomalous beliefs, including belief in conspiracy theories. 
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One way of interpreting these findings is to suggest that conspiracy theories form (or 
should be considered as) a subset of anomalous beliefs, akin to paranormal beliefs of magical 
ideation. Clearly, some conspiracy theories fit this categorisation: to return to the example we 
provided earlier, believing that Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan unwittingly made contact 
with aliens and were abducted during their final flight is delusional (Swami & Furnham, 
2012), given the lack of evidence for the specific claim or for the existing aliens. This being 
the case, individuals who experience maladaptive cognitive-perceptual processing may be 
more likely to accept a range of beliefs that are anomalous. This explanation would also help 
to reports of significant associations between conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs 
(e.g., Brotherton & Eser, 2014; Lobato et al., 2014; Stieger et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2011). 
Our suggestion here is that acceptance of both sets of beliefs, as well as other related 
suppositions, are underscored by the same underlying maladaptive personality facet.
Having said that, it is also clear that not all conspiracy theories are delusional: 
believing that Earhart and Noonan intentionally downed their aircraft so that the U.S. Navy 
could spy on the Japanese may be implausible, but it is not entirely impossible (Swami & 
Furnham, 2012). Indeed, a common feature of many conspiracy theories is that they present 
alternative explanations of events that are possible, even if improbable. Defining all 
conspiracy theories as anomalous beliefs may, therefore, have little utility. Instead, it is 
possible that the traits tapped by Unusual Beliefs and Experiences – such as an over-reliance 
on intuitive-experiential processing of information – are conducive to the acceptance of 
theories and ideas that lack evidence (Swami et al., 2014). That is, an underlying maladaptive 
personality disposition is conducive to the development of a worldview or worldviews that 
are more accepting of conspiracy theories (Dagnall et al., 2015). 
This finding also sheds light on the positive relationship between the Big Five facet of 
Openness to Experience and belief in conspiracy theories that has been reported in several 
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studies (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), but not others (Swami & Furnham, 2012). Proponents of 
the Five-Factor Model of personality have argued that Openness is important when 
considering personality pathology (Piedmont, Sherman, Dy-Liacco, & Williams, 2009).  
Moreover, Openness appears to be associated with the PID-5 domain of Psychoticism, 
sometimes in opposing directions (Chmielewski, Babgy, Markon, Ring, & Ryder, 2014). 
Taking these findings together, it is possible that reports of associations between Openness 
and belief in conspiracy theories are artefactual. In effect, this association emerges because of 
shared conceptual space between Openness and Psychoticism as measured by the PID-5. A 
future study on belief in conspiracy theories that concurrently measures maladaptive 
personality traits along with facets of Openness to Experience would help to resolve this 
issue. 
The relationship between suspiciousness and belief in conspiracy theories will 
likewise require further investigation. Here, we found that the facet of Suspiciousness 
emerged as a significant predictor of belief in conspiracy theories, although it explained only 
a small proportion of shared variance. In previous work, however, Barron et al. (2014) 
reported that a schizotypy-based measure of Paranoid Ideation/Suspiciousness did not predict 
belief in conspiracy theories once the effects of odd beliefs had been accounted for. It would 
seem, therefore, that suspiciousness is only weakly associated with belief in conspiracy 
theories. Dagnall et al. (2015) explain that suspiciousness may lead individuals to focus on 
self-generated or self-affirmed views, but that it is insufficient to produce conspiratorial 
thinking on its own. 
A number of limitations of the present study should be considered. First, because we 
did not collect information about participant country of origin, it is difficult to know how 
homogeneous our sample truly is. While we were able to rule out between-group differences 
in key demographics (ethnicity and education), we were not able to rule out cross-national 
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differences. This is important because the function of conspiracy theories may differ across 
cultural groups (Swami, 2012) and because existing data suggests there may be significant, 
albeit small, differences across national groups (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & 
Imhoff, 2013). In a similar vein, while MTurk samples are more demographically-diverse 
than standard Internet samples and the site is recognised as a source of high-quality data for 
social science research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). MTurk participants are also 
known to be less extraverted and have lower self-esteem than traditional samples (Goodman, 
Cryder, & Cheema, 2013). These issues limit the generalisability of our findings, but could be 
addressed in future work with more precise recruitment methods to ensure representativeness.
These limitations aside, our work sheds light on current theorising about belief in 
conspiracy theories. It is apparent that maladaptive personality traits play a role in shaping 
belief in conspiracy theories and may also help to unify the findings of earlier studies. Our 
argument is that there are underlying traits that are associated with conspiracist ideation and 
that are being tapped by scholars focused on measures of schizotypy and general personality 
structure. Of course, it would be wrong to suggest that such belief in conspiracy theories is 
driven solely by maladaptive personality traits, particularly given the small amount of 
variance accounted for in our study. Nevertheless, by focusing on these traits, scholars will be 
able to arrive at a fuller conceptual account of belief in conspiracy theories, which rightly 
views such beliefs as both rational narratives and shaped by underlying maladaptive traits. 
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Table 1. Internal Consistency Coefficients (Cronbach’s α) for the Personality Inventory for 
DSM-5 Domain and Facet Scores and Correlations with Belief in Conspiracy Theories
PID-5 Domains and Facets Cronbach’s α Correlation with BCTI





Attention Seeking .93 .38
Psychoticism Domain .94 .49
Perceptual Dysregulation .94 .46
Eccentricity .96 .45
Unusual Beliefs and Experiences .91 .48
Disinhibition Domain .89 .42




Risk Taking .86 .24
Negative Affectivity Domain .87 .40
Emotional Lability .89 .39
Perseveration .92 .41
Anxiousness .90 .26




Detachment Domain .91 .34





Intimacy Avoidance .89 .34
Note. PID-5 = Personality Inventory for the DSM-5; BCTI = Belief in Conspiracy Theories 
Inventory. Correlation coefficients in bold represent r ≥ |.43|; all correlation coefficients are 
significant at p < .001. 
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Table 2. Regression Coefficients for the Analysis with the Five PDI-5 Facets as Predictor 
Variables
Facet B SE ß t p
Unusual Beliefs and Experiences .36 .16 .27 2.17 .031
Perceptual Dysregulation -.06 .21 -.05 -0.30 .767
Eccentricity .18 .13 .14 1.42 .157
Suspiciousness .33 .13 .20 2.60 .010
Callousness .03 .17 .02 0.15 .882
